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We analyse Hutto and Myin´s three arguments against computationalism 
(Hutto and Myin 2012, 2017; Hutto et al. forthcoming). The Hard Problem 
of Content targets computationalism that relies on semantic notion of 
computation, claiming that it cannot account for the natural origins of 
content. The Intentionality Problem is targeted against computationalism 
using non-semantic accounts of computation, arguing that it fails in 
explaining intentionality. The Abstraction Problem claims that causal 
interaction between concrete physical processes and abstract 
computational properties is problematic. We argue that these arguments 
are flawed and are not enough to rule out computationalism. 
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In recent years, many have argued that there can be cognitive science without the 
computational hypothesis of mind (see Chemero 2009; Chemero and Silberstein 
2008; Stepp et al. 2011; Van Gelder 1995; Van Gelder and Port 1995; Varela, 
Thompson, and Rosch 1992). One such a proposal can be found in Hutto & Myin’s 
Radical Enactive Cognition (REC) (2012, 2017; Hutto et al. forthcoming)1.  
 
According to REC, cognition is, using Hutto and Myin’s characterization, a multi-
storey story: there is both non-representational basic cognition and socio-culturally 
scaffolded, potentially representational cognition. With this distinction Hutto and Myin 
want to contrast their account with a view they dub as contemporary cognitivism, 
which ‘takes it to be axiomatic that “the mind represents and computes” (Branquinho 
2001, xv)’ (Hutto and Myin 2017, 3).  In this picture, cognitivism consists of two ‘twin 
pillars’, computationalism and representationalism, and is ‘methodologically 
committed to providing explanations of a mechanistic variety’.  According to Hutto 
and Myin, this approach is a ‘single-storey’ account of cognition because it, 
according to them, suggests that all cognition is representational. Hutto and Myin 
aim to reject this kind of cognitivism which takes cognition as computation of inner 
representations.  
 
However, their earlier arguments are targeted mainly against representationalism 
and not against computationalism per se. Instead of proper and careful arguments, 
they have made some short but explicit remarks, such as ‘representation and 
computation ... are not definitive of, and do not form the basis of, all mentality’ (Hutto 
and Myin 2012, 3), and that their ‘rejection of … the twin representational and 
computational pillars of cognitivism, is motivated by the avoidance of deep 
theoretical mysteries’ (Hutto and Myin 2017, 51, italics added). Only in their most 
recent paper (Hutto et al. forthcoming) they address the issue of computationalism in 
a more detail.  
 
                                               
1 There has already been discussion on the arguments against computationalism in classical 
enactivism (Dewhurst and Villalobos 2017; Villalobos and Dewhurst 2017, 2018). 
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In this article, we argue that all Hutto and Myin’s arguments against 
computationalism fail. Hence, they have not provided sufficient reasons for rejecting 
computationalism. However, we emphasize that (i) we do not intend to argue for or 
against computationalism, (ii) we do not intend  to argue for or against enactivism, 
and (iii) we do not intend to argue that computationalism is compatible with REC. 
 
This paper is organised as follows: In section 2 we briefly describe what 
computationalism entails. Section 3 presents Hutto and Myin’s first argument (2012) 
against computationalism, the Hard Problem of Content (HPC). We argue that it 
leaves non-semantic views of computation untouched. Because of this, even if one 
agrees with the HPC, Hutto and Myin’s early rejection of computationalism per se 
fails. In section 4 we look at an argument we call the Intentionality Problem (Hutto 
and Myin 2017), which comes in the form of a dilemma. Unlike their earlier objection, 
this argument is aimed also against non-semantic accounts of computation. We 
argue that the Intentionality Problem is flawed since it rests on a confusion 
concerning what computationalism entails. In section 5 we present their most recent 
objection which we call the Abstraction Problem (Hutto et al. forthcoming), and argue 
that it is based on a confusion concerning the notion of abstraction. Our conclusion 
(section 6) is that Hutto and Myin do not provide sufficient reasons for rejecting 




2. What is computationalism? 
 
To cut it short, computationalism is a view according to which cognition is 
computational. However, it comes many forms, and certain distinctions should be 
made to respect the complexity at hand.  
 
First, computation may be studied mathematically by formally defining computational 
objects such as algorithms and proving theorems about their properties. While this 
kind of study of computational objects and their properties belongs to mathematics, 
physical computation tries to explain what it means for a physical system to perform 
a computation. From this perspective, computationalism is about physical 
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computation: assuming that cognition is a physical phenomenon, does it compute--
and if it does, why? (Piccinini 2007b, 2015; Sprevak 2010) Second, 
computationalism can be defended in stronger and weaker versions. The weaker 
versions take only some cognitive processes to be computational, while the 
strongest formulations take all cognitive processes to be computational. 
 
The third distinction concerns the nature of computation itself: there are semantic 
and non-semantic views of computation. For example, one may support a semantic 
view according to which it is necessary for computation to be manipulation of 
contentful representations (e.g., Fodor 1975), or a non-semantic view which denies 
this (e.g., Piccinini 2015; Stich 1983). There is also another sense in which an 
account can be semantic. This concerns the question of how computations are to be 
individuated. According to the semantic accounts, we need representations or 
semantic content to individuate computations (e.g., Fodor 1975, 1981). Non-
semantic accounts of computational individuation deny this, claiming that semantics 
is not needed to individuate computations. For example, according to Piccinini 
(2007a, 2015), computational states are individuated by their functional properties, 
and their functional properties are specified through an appeal to a mechanism in a 
way that need not refer to any semantic properties.2 In this paper, by a semantic 
account of computation we refer to an account that is semantic in either of the ways 
described above.  
 
Fourth, there is a distinction between ontological and explanatory computationalism. 
The ontological computationalists think that cognitive and neurocognitive systems 
literally perform computations, while the explanatory computationalists see it as 
useful to ascribe computations to cognition without making any explicit claims about 
whether those processes really are computational.  In contrast to some famous 
intuitions (Fodor 1975), computationalism is not tied to the view that cognition should 
- or could - be explained only computationally. Rather, computationalism entails 
merely that cognitive processes allow for a computational explanation.3 This does 
                                               
2 In reality, the question of semantics of computation is even more messy than described here. One 
can talk about semantics at least at the level of explanation (algorithms versus computations), 
characteristics of representations, individuation of computations, and implementation. 
3 It is also worth noting that there is not consensus on the meaning of computational explanation itself 
(Rusanen and Lappi 2007). 
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not imply that cognition or cognitive phenomena must be explained computationally, 
or that computational explanations would be the only acceptable type of explanations 
for cognitive phenomena. Instead, many defend the view that full explanations of 
implemented cognitive phenomena may require also neural and other type of 
explanations4. 
 
From now on, by computationalism we mean a mainstream view of computational 
theory of cognition, according to which cognitive states and cognitive processes are 
computational. The take-home message of this section is that computationalism 
does not entail any specific sort of explanation nor a way of individuating 
computations. It is a claim concerning the underlying nature of cognitive processes. 
 
 
3. Computationalism and the Hard Problem of Content 
 
In their first book, Hutto and Myin (2012) do not explicate what they mean by 
computation or computationalism, but they explicitly claim that ‘representation and 
computation ... are not definitive of, and do not form the basis of, all mentality’ (Hutto 
and Myin 2012, 3). A major part of the argumentation in the book is devoted to the 
Hard Problem of Content (HPC)5. 
 
The HPC is targeted primarily against traditional representationalist accounts of 
cognition, which take representation and content to be defining features of cognition. 
By content, Hutto and Myin mean the semantic features of representations. My 
utterance ‘there is a mug on the table’ has content, since it has conditions of 
satisfaction: it is true in the case that there is a mug on the table, and it is false in the 
case there is not. Conditions of satisfaction form the minimum requirement for 
something counting as a representation.6 Thus, if something is a representation, it 
                                               
4 For discussion, see (Egan 2017; Kaplan 2011; Miłkowski 2013; Piccinini and Craver 2011; Rusanen 
and Lappi 2016; Shagrir 2010; Weiskopf 2011).   
5 Whether the HPC should be seen as a genuine worry for representationalism has already received a 
lot of discussion. See (Colombo 2014; Miłkowski 2015; Shapiro 2014) for critical remarks and (Hutto 
and Myin 2014, 2017) for replies.  
6 There are also proposals that representations need not involve such content. According to Hutto and 
Myin, however, this kind of talk muddles the conversation. They suggest that if one is not willing to talk 
about content, it is better to abandon the notion of representation altogether. 
 
Making too many enemies 
6 
 
has content. According to the HPC, traditional semantic theories of cognition cannot 
give a scientifically respectable story of content and hence, we should abandon the 
idea that cognition always involves contentful representations. 
 
According to Hutto and Myin, all naturalists7 who posit content to cognition must 
somehow answer the HPC. Their own answer to the HPC is a neo-pragmatist, socio-
cultural story of the origins of content. According to REC, ‘“the primary bearers of 
content are semantically articulated symbols, occurring in appropriate dynamic 
patterns” (Haugeland 1990, 412)’ (Hutto and Myin 2017, 124). This story claims that 
content appears on the scene only at the ‘socio-culturally scaffolded level’ of 
cognition and hence, there is no content at the level of basic cognition. This is bad 
news for representationalists who claim, according to Hutto and Myin, that a defining 
feature of cognition is the manipulation of representations. If representationalists 
accept that there is cognitive behaviour also below the so-called socio-cultural level 
of cognition, this entails that there are representations also at the basic level. 
However, representations at the level of basic cognition are problematic, since 
representations are entities that have semantic features such as sense, content and 
reference, and those are features that can be found only at the socio-cultural level of 
cognition. If one wants to remain naturalistic, such content needs a scientifically 
respectable explanation which, according to Hutto and Myin, is not available at the 
level of basic cognition. They analyse a teleosemantic answer to the HPC, which 
they consider as the most promising and popular one, but argue that it cannot solve 
the problem (Hutto & Myin 2012, ch. 4, 2017, 41-45). Their conclusion is that we 
should not posit representations to basic cognition. 
 
The HPC can be seen as a problem for certain kind of computationalism, since some 
(e.g., most of the traditional) semantic accounts of computation either take 
computation to be manipulation of representations or claim that computations must 
be individuated semantically. In either case, representations are involved in both 
basic and socio-cultural cognition which, according to Hutto and Myin, makes 
                                               
7 Hutto and Myin do not give a precise definition of what they mean by naturalism. Roughly, for them 
naturalism amounts to giving a scientifically respectable story of a certain phenomenon. They 
distinguish strict naturalism from a more relaxed naturalism. When the strict naturalism allows only the 
so-called hard sciences to appear in a naturalist story, the more relaxed naturalism takes on board 
more explanatory power by recruiting ‘the full range of scientifically respectable resources, drawing on 
the findings of a wide variety of sciences that include not just the hard sciences’ (2017, 124) 
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computationalism unable to answer the HPC. However, as argued in the section 2, 
not all accounts of computation take computation to entail representations. For this 
reason, non-semantic and semantically neutral accounts of computation are not 
affected by the HPC8. This leads to the conclusion that Hutto and Myin’s early 
rejection of computationalism per se is unjustified. 
 
 
4. The Intentionality Problem 
 
The objection we call Intentionality Problem (Hutto and Myin 2017) is a more explicit 
argument against computationalism. It is a part of a dilemma argument, which is 
supposed to affect also non-semantic and semantically neutral accounts of 
computation. The first horn of the argument is the Hard Problem of Content (HPC): 
the traditional account of cognitivism, which takes computationalism and 
representationalism as the twin pillars of cognition, is unable to answer the HPC. 
This can be read also in a way that any form of computationalism that both relies on 
a semantic notion of computation and is strong enough to claim that cognitive 
processes at the level of basic cognition are computational is unable to answer the 
HPC. As we have already argued above, the HPC does not concern 
computationalism per se but only certain kinds of semantic computationalism.9  
 
If one wants to make such a move to avoid the HPC, that is, drop out 
representations out of the picture and adopt a non-semantic account of computation, 
she is faced with the second horn of the dilemma, which is the Intentionality 
Problem. The motivation behind the Intentionality Problem is that the standard 
approach in explaining intentionality is, according to Hutto and Myin, to use 
representations: representations are entities that have semantic features such as 
reference, which are handy for the task. Views which hold that cognition is entirely a 
matter of non-representational computations and offer no successor notion for 
                                               
8 To be more specific, only sufficiently strong variants of semantic computationalism are affected by 
this argument: a weak variant semantic computationalism might be seen unaffected by the HPC if it 
does not claim that cognitive processes at the level of basic cognition are computational. 
9 Whether the HPC should be seen as a genuine worry for representationalism has already received a 
lot of discussion. See (Colombo 2014; Miłkowski 2015; Shapiro 2014), and (Hutto and Myin 2014, 
2017) for replies.  
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representation ‘will be unable to explain how organisms relate to and connect with 
targeted aspects of their worldly environments’ (Hutto and Myin 2017, 50). In a 
nutshell, if one accepts the conclusion of HPC and makes the basic level of cognition 
representation-free, computation alone cannot explain intentionality, according to 
Hutto and Myin. In other words, to solve the dilemma one must either provide an 
answer to the HPC or introduce a successor notion for semantic representations that 
can explain intentionality. 
 
Hutto and Myin consider a possible reply to the Intentionality Problem, which is to 
come up with a successor notion for representation that can account for 
intentionality. The candidate notion they consider is semantic sensitivity, by which 
they mean a property of computations that Piccinini10 (2004, 2006, 2007a, 2015, 32) 
and Rescorla (2012, 2014) consider: even if computations are not representational in 
nature and need not be identified by representations, computations can still be 
sensitive to semantic properties. This, however, makes the view again vulnerable to 
the HPC: ‘We have been at pains to show that paying for that assumption requires 
facing up to the HPC’ (Hutto and Myin 2017, 51). This all leads to the conclusion that 
computationalism is either tied to the HPC or cannot explain intentionality. 
 
Here is our reconstruction of the argument. First, Hutto and Myin asks us to agree on 
two things: 
(i) All cognition is not alike. There is basic cognition which is not 
representational, and then there is socio-culturally scaffolded cognition which 
can be representational.  
(ii) Even though basic cognition is not representational, it can be intentional.  
Then, the argument continues:  
(iii) The traditional way of dealing with intentionality is positing contentful 
representations to cognition.  
(iv) Using contentful representations in explaining intentionality makes the 
HPC unsolvable, since it posits representations to all levels of cognition.  
                                               
10 For the traditional discussion, see (Fodor 1981). 
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(v) If one tries to solve the HPC by letting go of representations and adopt a 
non-semantic or semantically neutral account of computation, she is unable to 
explain intentionality without a successor notion. Thus,  
(vi) if representations are left out, computationalism needs the notion of 
semantic sensitivity to account for intentionality. However,  
(vii) semantic sensitivity leads back to the HPC, which computationalism 
cannot solve.  
(viii) Since computationalism cannot solve the HPC, computationalism is 
rejected. 
 
We argue that even if we accepted, for the sake of the argument, premises (i) -- (v), 
the crucial premise is (vi) false11. Computationalism does not entail a specific story of 
intentionality and hence, it does not need to rely on semantic sensitivity. For this 
reason, the argument is unsound. 
 
Apparently, the reason why Hutto and Myin assume that computationalism, which 
relies on non-semantic or content-neutral computation, needs the notion of semantic 
sensitivity is the fact that Piccinini and Rescorla talk about semantic sensitivity when 
formulating their stances on computation. Hutto and Myin (2017) quote Piccinini 
(2015), drawing a conclusion that Piccinini’s theory of computation is tied to semantic 
sensitivity: 
 
They allow that even if computations are not essentially individuated by 
semantic properties—even if computations have a wholly nonsemantic and 
mechanistic nature—they can still be sensitive to semantic properties 
(Rescorla 2012a, 2014; Piccinini 2015). Why so? The reason this is the 
preferred view is clear enough. Such theorists feel compelled to assume that 
“there are … semantic properties that relate many computing systems to their 
environment […]” (Piccinini 2015, 32). We have been at pains to show that 
paying for that assumption requires facing up to the HPC [Hard Problem of 
Content] in one of the ways described above. (Hutto and Myin, 2017) 
 
                                               
11 As mentioned earlier in the fn. 6, one can also try to argue that the HPC itself is not a proper 
problem. In this paper, we try another strategy. 
 
Making too many enemies 
10 
 
However, it is problematic to infer on that computationalism relying on non-semantic 
or semantically neutral account of computation needs the notion of semantic 
sensitivity. This is not the case. First, even though Piccinini is vague and sketchy 
when it comes to semantic sensitivity12, he seems to be talking about internal 
semantics. Internal semantics is ‘fully determined by the functional and structural 
properties … independently of any external semantics’ (Piccinini 2015, 135, italics 
added). In contrast, philosophers are traditionally talking about external semantics, 
that ‘relates a state to things other than its computational effects ... including objects 
and properties in the external world’ (Piccinini 2015, 135). Piccinini makes it clear 
that in order for computations to be sensitive to semantic properties, there has to be 
a causal mechanism between them, meaning that computations cannot be sensitive 
to “wide” meanings.13 Putting this another way, the way Piccinini defines computation 
does not force him, or any other computationalist, to accept the idea of semantic 
sensitivity in a way that Hutto and Myin envisions. 
 
Second, Piccinini does not even try to explain intentionality by appealing to 
computations alone. As Piccinini explicitly writes, computation may or may not 
contribute in explaining intentionality: ‘whether computation has a semantic nature 
should not be confused with whether computation … explains … intentionality … I 
will remain neutral on whether being computational contributes to explain original 
intentionality’ (Piccinini 2015, 32, italics added). The nature of intentionality is a 
separate--and perhaps partially empirical--question, and so is the question whether 
intentionality turns out to be computational or not. In sum, computationalism does not 
entail anything about the appropriate strategy for explaining intentionality. However, 
depending on how strong a thesis one supports, naturalist computationalism must be 
                                               
12 In the very same passage that Hutto and Myin use, Piccinini writes that ‘[t]he issue of semantic 
properties and their role in computational causation is too complex a topic to address it here’ (Piccinini 
2015, 32).  Moreover, the meaning of semantics in the passage is not clear, and Piccinini writes that 
‘whether computation is sensitive to semantic properties depends on what ”sensitive” and ”semantic 
property” means’ (Piccinini 2015, 32). 
13 From this perspective, when Piccinini is talking about semantic sensitivity, the meaning of 
semantics is such that it seems compatible even with Hutto and Myin’s ideas of informational 
sensitivity, contentless signs and biological functions. 
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compatible with the best scientific theory of intentionality. And still, importantly, it is 
not up to computationalism to come up with an explanation of intentionality.14 
 
Because of this, there seems to be no a priori reason why computationalism could 
not be seen compatible with Hutto and Myin´s own account of intentionality, 
according to which one should ‘seek to explain how full-blown cognitive ... capacities 
might have been built-up from simpler, less abstract aspects’ (Muller 2014, 169) and 
‘surrender the idea that basic forms of intentionality need involve correctness or 
satisfactory conditions of any kind’ (Hutto and Myin 2017, 101). They aim to give a 
naturalistic account of “basic intentionality” with scientifically respectable notions, 
such of biological functions, dispositions, contentless signs, and informational 
sensitivity, to mention a few. They continue by explicating that ‘This is more or less 
the REC view: in basic kinds of cognition an organism’s skillful engagements with the 
world are best understood in embodied, enactive, and nonrepresentational ways’ 
(101-102). However, Hutto and Myin do not provide any reasons for why these 
should not be seen or described as computational. In fact, some of the most elegant 
neurocognitive theories of “skillful engagements” can be, and are, given in purely 
computational terms (e.g., Franklin and Wolpert 2011; Wolpert, Doya, and Kawato 
2003; Wolpert and Ghahramani 2000).  
 
To sum up, in their 2017 book, Hutto and Myin do not consider the possibility that 
computationalism could adopt their own story of intentionality. Instead, they assume 
that computationalism is forced to come up with a “single-storey story” of cognition, 
which entails that computationalism is bound to be unable to answer the HPC. 
According to their treatment, the options open for computationalism are either to 
posit semantics to every level of cognition, or refrain from postulating semantics to 
cognition altogether. However, as we have argued, if a computationalist adopts a 
non-semantic account of computation it does not imply that she is forced to lean on a 
semantic notion to explain intentionality, even if some computationalists do so. 
Hence, we conclude, the Intentionality Problem is unsound. 
 
                                               
14 Elsewhere, Morgan and Piccinini (2018) defend a multi-level mechanistic account of intentionality 
that is committed to the Representational Hypothesis of Cognition. Despite this fact, the explanation 
of intentionality and the role of semantics is, in principle, independent of the computational framework. 
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Apparently, Hutto and Myin have noticed the shortcomings of their arguments, since 
in their forthcoming paper they do not outright reject computationalism. Instead, they 
present a new objection that is targeted especially against non-semantic account of 




5. The Abstraction Problem 
 
In their forthcoming paper, Hutto et al. they do not reject computationalism 
altogether, but ‘question the ability of ... [non-representational] theories [of 
computation] to deliver a metaphysically robust, naturalistic account of computation 
of the sort needed to support [computationalism]’. We call this new objection the 
Abstraction Problem15,16. 
 
According to the Abstraction Problem, the main challenge for the advocates of 
neomechanistic, non-semantic account of computation one like Piccinini’s is to 
explain ‘how concrete neural processes could causally manipulate abstract, medium 
independent vehicles’ (Hutto et al., forthcoming). Since, according to Hutto et al., 
defenders of the mechanistic theory of computation offer ‘no account of how such 
manipulations might be achieved’, they, Hutto et al. claim, cannot explain the 
computational basis of cognition. However, as we see it, their argument rests on a 
misunderstanding concerning the notion of abstraction and hence, it fails. 
 
Let´s take a look at the Abstraction Problem in a more detail. According to Hutto et 
al., the ‘apparent obstacle’ in defending computationalism through an appeal to a 
                                               
15 Instead of using the term computationalism, Hutto et al. talk about “Computational Basis of 
Cognition” (CBC). However, it seems to us that CBC is just another name for computationalism. 
16 Three remarks are relevant concerning the notion of computationalism in their forthcoming paper. 
First, Hutto et al. are talking about the strongest possible variant of computationalism: all cognitive 
processes must be computational. Hence, they fail to do justice to all the different variants of 
computational thinking. Also, according to them, computationalism maintains that ‘computation is a, if 
not the, explanatory basis for cognition’. The notion of “explanatory basis” is not clarified in the paper, 
which makes it ambiguous. Third, they make an implicit claim that computationalism is committed to 
internalism, that is, to the thesis that we should explain cognitive processes by looking at the brain-
based neural processes. This is false: computationalism can be seen compatible with wide 
computationalism, which denies internalism (Kersten 2016; Piccinini 1994, 2004, 2015; Wilson 1994, 
2004). 
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mechanistic theory of computation, is the nature of neural processes. As Hutto et al. 
put it, there are ‘clear dissimilarities between what happens in brains and what 
happens in artefactual computers’ (Hutto et al., forthcoming). Hutto et al. refer to 
Piccinini and Bahar’s article (2013)17, in which they analyse neural phenomena, such 
as the so-called spike trains, as the primary candidates ‘for interneural long-distance 
signaling’ (Piccinini and Bahar 2013, 462). However, as Piccinini and Bahar remark, 
‘typical neural signals, such as spike trains … are neither continuous signals nor 
strings of digits’ (453). Hence, spike trains cannot be analyzed through classical 
computability theory (Piccinini 2008; Piccinini and Bahar 2013).  
 
Instead of drawing the conclusion that these type of neural signals are not 
computational, Piccinini and Bahar suggest that they are computational sui generis.18 
Hutto et al. claim that one would be ‘equally justified in concluding that brains do not 
compute’. However, this is not the case. Piccinini and Bahar do not make merely an 
ad hoc proposal that since spike trains--or other similar neural processes--are not 
computational in the standard--that is, digital--sense, they are computational in some 
other sense.  
 
Instead, that conclusion follows from an interpretation of empirical evidence through 
the lense of Piccinini’s theory of physical computation. In Piccinini’s account, digital 
and analog computation are subclasses of generic computation. Even if spike trains 
are neither digital nor analog computation, they do fall within the scope and criteria of 
generic computation mainly because they seem to be, according to Piccinini and 
Bahar, medium independent. Hence, while Piccinini and Bahar provide an argument 
for the claim that spike trains should be seen as a form of computation, Hutto et al. 
provide none for their “equally justified”, alternative and contrary conclusion. 
 
Piccinini and Bahar note that spike trains seem to be medium independent since, 
according to the current evidence, ‘functionally relevant aspects of neural processes 
                                               
17 For the original argument, see (Piccinini 2008). 
18 Piccinini and Bahar give two arguments for generic computationalism. The first is ‘the argument 
from the functional organization of the nervous system’, which is the one we summarized. The second 
one is ‘the argument from semantic information processing’. In that argument, Piccinini and Bahar 
claim that at least some cognitive processes, like language processing, seem to require 
representations in Hutto & Myin’s sense. However, Piccinini and Bahar’s argument for generic 
computationalism does not hang on this claim. 
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depend on dynamical aspects of the vehicles--most relevantly, spike rates and spike 
timing … and may be implemented either by neural tissue or by some other physical 
medium, such as a silicon-based circuit … thereby qualifying as proper vehicles for 
generic computation’ (Piccinini and Bahar 2013, 462). In other words, these 
‘vehicles’ can be seen as medium independent because they may be implemented 
by other appropriate physical medium. This, Piccinini and Bahar claim, is the main 
reason why spike trains qualify as vehicles for computation. 
 
However, according to Hutto et al., ‘[i]t is questionable ... that the neural ... processes 
... have the feature of being medium independent’ (Hutto et al. forthcoming). It is 
questionable, because ‘[t]here is reason to doubt that neural events could contribute 
to cognitive work if that work really requires the concrete manipulation of medium-
independent vehicles.’ Furthermore, ‘[t]he trouble is that if medium independent 
vehicles are defined by their abstract properties then it is unclear how such vehicles 
could be concretely manipulated’ and hence, computationalists have ‘no conception 
of how’ these vehicles could be processed neurally. Thus, according to the 
Abstraction Problem, the real difficulty is to explain how concrete neural processes 
‘could causally manipulate abstract, medium independent vehicles’. 
 
As we see it, the Abstraction Problem is based on a misunderstanding concerning 
what the abstract nature of medium independent vehicles means. In one sense, 
Hutto et al. confuse the metaphysical and explanatory claims (see section 2 for the 
distinction). Namely, for Piccinini, concrete computations and their vehicles can be 
defined independently of the physical media that implement them (Piccinini 2015 
120-122). Putting this another way, for Piccinini the abstraction is a matter of omitting 
irrelevant features, and not a matter of assuming that these features exist in a 
metaphysically abstract way.  For example, if one makes a model of the famous 
aeroplane, “the Spirit of St.Louis”, one may omit some of the target system´s details 
and that way construct an abstracted model of the original plane. This does not 
affect the properties of the original plane. Or, if one wants to explain the 
aerodynamics of the Spirit of St.Louis, one may ignore many of the plane´s 
properties, such as its color, as irrelevant for the explanation, and thus have an 
abstracted explanation of a target system (Craver 2006; Craver and Kaplan 2018). In 
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the same sense, for Piccinini, the medium independent vehicles are abstract in a 
sense that they can be described at different levels of abstractions.  
 
In other words, to describe concrete computations and the vehicles they manipulate 
one need not consider all of their specific physical properties (Piccinini 2015, 120-
122). Instead, one may consider only the properties that are relevant to the 
computation according to the rules that define the computation. Importantly, these 
higher-level properties, such as the medium independent properties, can be realized 
in different lower-level properties that constitute different mechanisms at the 
immediate lower mechanistic levels. This does not make the higher-level properties 
any less metaphysically concrete. 
 
However, Hutto et al. seem to think that when talking about the description of 
medium independent vehicles, Piccinini uses the notion of abstract in a way that 
makes the vehicles, not the descriptions of them, metaphysically abstract. Namely, 
Hutto et al.´s claim about the neo-mechanists´ difficulties with ‘explaining how... 
abstract entities can be causally manipulated’ by ‘concrete...processes’ would not 
make any sense if it was not committed to the metaphysical interpretation of abstract 
vehicles.  
 
But, the claim that computational descriptions are committed to the existence of 
abstract medium independent vehicles is a result of a confusion between the 
abstractness as a feature of models or descriptions and of ‘the processes being 
modelled’ (Polger and Shapiro 2016, 166). Instead, as Polger and Shapiro 
emphasize, the medium independence of vehicles should be interpreted as a claim 
that the computational models describe the target phenomena in an abstract way 
rather than as a claim that the properties or processes of target systems can exist in 
an abstract way (Polger and Shapiro 2016, 166)19. Namely, one can have 
descriptions of concrete vehicles as medium independent and abstract, but one 
                                               
19 According to Polger & Shapiro (2016), also Piccinini and Bahar (2013) and Piccinini (2015) make 
this mistake. However, Polger & Shapiro (2016) focuses mostly on the multiple realizability of medium 
independent vehicles, and it is not obviously clear to what extent that argument can be utilized in a 
way that Hutto et al. (forthcoming) do. Moreover, even if there were certain problems in Piccinini´s 
account, that issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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cannot have (metaphysically) concrete vehicles that are (metaphysically) abstract at 





In this article, we have analysed the objections against computationalism presented 
by radical enactivism (Hutto and Myin 2012, 2017; Hutto et al. forthcoming). Hutto 
and Myin’s early rejection of computationalism (Hutto and Myin 2012) is based on 
the Hard Problem of Content (HPC), according to which traditional views, such as 
teleosemantic accounts that posit representations to all levels of cognition, are 
unable to give a naturalist explanation of representations at the basic level. However, 
the HPC considers only certain semantic accounts of computation, making Hutto and 
Myin’s rejection of computationalism per se unjustified. 
 
According to their more interesting dilemma argument (Hutto and Myin 2017), 
computationalism is unable either to answer the HPC or to explain intentionality. The 
first horn of the argument is the HPC. If one tries to avoid the HPC by leaving 
representations out of the picture, she is faced with the second horn of the argument, 
which is the Intentionality Problem. According to the Intentionality Problem, positing 
representations is the standard strategy for explaining intentionality, and if one 
abandons representations, she cannot explain intentionality without a successor 
notion. Hutto and Myin consider the notion of semantic sensitivity as a possible reply 
and successor notion for the task, and argue that it does not resolve the issue, since 
it makes computationalism again semantic and thus, unable to answer the HPC. We 
have argued that the second horn of the dilemma is unsound. Hutto and Myin’s 
suggestion that computationalism needs the notion of semantic sensitivity for 
explaining intentionality is false. The main problem of their argument is that the way 
Hutto and Myin treat computationalism does not give computationalism any other 
option but to face the HPC: the only successor notion they consider for explaining 
intentionality is semantic in nature which, by definition, makes computationalism 
unable to answer the HPC. However, if a computationalist adopts a non-semantic 
account of computation, it does not follow that she is forced to lean on a semantic 
account to explain intentionality, even if some computationalists do so. Importantly, 
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Hutto and Myin do not consider the possibility that computation could be seen 
compatible with their own story of intentionality. 
 
Their recent objection to computationalism is a problem which we call he Abstraction 
Problem (Hutto et al. forthcoming). According to the Abstraction Problem, the main 
challenge for the advocates of neomechanistic, non-semantic account of 
computation is to explain ‘how concrete neural processes could causally manipulate 
abstract, medium independent vehicles’ (Hutto et al. forthcoming). We have argued 
that the Abstraction Problem rests on a misunderstanding concerning the notion of 
abstraction and hence, it fails. 
 
Our diagnosis is that the main problem behind all three arguments is a confusion 
concerning what computationalism entails: Computationalism is a thesis about the 
underlying nature of cognitive processes, and it comes in many forms. Moreover, 
computationalism by itself does not entail commitments to representations, any 
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